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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE WAR TERROR:
SEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11
HISTORY REPEATING: DUE PROCESS,
TORTURE AND PRIVACY DURING
THE WAR ON TERROR*
Erwin Chemerinsky**
I. INTRODUCTION
INCE September 11, 2001, some of the worst aspects of American
history have been repeating themselves.1 Throughout American
history, the response to crisis, especially a foreign-based crisis, has
been repression.2 In hindsight, we come to realize that we were not made
any safer from the loss of rights.
The best way to appraise what has happened since September 11 is to
understand the context that occurred before it. The story could start
early in American history when the survival of the Republic was still in
doubt, when in 1798 Congress passed the Sedition Act.3 That law made it
a federal crime to falsely criticize the government and governmental offi-
cials. 4 The government convicted and imprisoned individuals under this
law for speech that is tamer than what Jay Leno or David Letterman says
on a nightly basis.5 When Thomas Jefferson ran for President in 1800, he
did so in part on a platform to have the Alien and Sedition Act be re-
pealed. 6 Once elected, Jefferson pardoned all that were convicted under
the law, and in 1801 the Sedition Act was repealed. 7 Although the consti-
* This Essay is based on an address delivered at SMU Law School on November 11,
2008 sponsored by the Dallas Lawyer Chapter and the Southern Methodist University
Dedman School of Law Student Chapter of the American Constitutional Society and the
Dallas Chapter of the Federal Bar Association.
** Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irving School
of Law.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Liberties and the War on Terrorism, 45 WASHBURN L.J.
1, 1 (2005).
2. Id.
3. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes against the United States (Sedition
Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
4. Id.
5. Chemerinksy, supra note 1.
6. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, FINDING JEFFERSON: A LOST LETTER, A REMARKABLE Dis-
COVERY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 40 (2008).
7. Id.
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tutionality of the Sedition Act was never tested, the Supreme Court later
observed that the law was declared unconstitutional in the court of his-
tory.8 That is a wonderful metaphor, but it does not change the reality.
People were convicted and spent time in prison just for criticizing the
government.
Unfortunately, the government's repression of basic civil liberties did
not end in the early Republic. During the Civil War, for instance, it is
often forgotten that Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas
corpus. 9 At the time this sort of unilateral exercise of presidential au-
thority was unprecedented.10 And after the Civil War, the Supreme
Court declared this presidential action unconstitutional.1' It is also often
forgotten that at least hundreds and maybe thousands of individuals were
imprisoned for criticizing how the North was fighting the Civil War.1 2
There is no indication that this altered the war effort in any measurable
way or that it made the slightest difference in regard to the war effort, but
people lost their rights just for criticizing the government.
World War I brought a similar repression of rights. First, in 1917 Con-
gress passed the Espionage Act, which prohibited individuals from inter-
fering with the success of the war effort and essentially made it a crime to
openly express opinions that could be construed as helping the enemy.' 3
This was followed by the Sedition Act of 1918, which made it a crime to
use profane or disloyal language in reference to the War. 14 The combine
effect of these laws was to virtually silence speech critical of the war
effort.
In Schenk v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of the Espionage Act head on.15 If you are in law school now
and you have taken First Amendment Law recently, you might remember
Schenck. Even if it has been a while since you were in law school, you
might remember Schenck. It was the first major Supreme Court case
dealing with the First Amendment. Schenck involved a man who circu-
lated a leaflet and argued that the draft was both unconstitutional and a
form of involuntary servitude. 16 There was not a shred of evidence that
this leaflet had the slightest effect on military recruitment, but he was
convicted under the 1917 statute and sentenced to ten years in prison.' 7
The Supreme Court upheld his conviction and sentence. 18 According to
8. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
9. Chemerinksy, supra note 1.
10. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 114-15 (1866).
11. Id. at 130-31.
12. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 96-97 (2004).
13. Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-25, tit. V, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, repealed by
Act of Mar. 3, 1921, ch. 138, 41 Stat. 1359.
14. Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553, 553-54, repealed by Act of Mar. 3,
1921, ch. 138, 41 Stat. 1359.
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919).
16. Id. at 51.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 53.
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the First Amendment is not absolute. 19
Instead, "the character of every act depends on the circumstances in
which it was done" and "[t]he question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger" of harm.20 Even the most stringent construc-
tion of the First Amendment cannot protect a man "falsely shouting fire
in a theatre and causing panic."2 1 But, Schenck's speech was the antithe-
sis of a clear and present danger. There was no clear and present danger
of an imminent threat of serious harm. His speech did not pose any
threat whatsoever.
Just seven days after Schenck was decided, the Supreme Court consid-
ered another challenge to the 1917 Espionage Act.2 2 In Debs v. United
States, socialist leader Eugene Debs was charged under both the Espio-
nage and Sedition Acts for a speech where he spoke out against the draft:
"[Y]ou need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery
and cannon fodder .... Don't worry about the charge of treason to your
masters; but be concerned about the treason that involves yourselves. '23
For saying that, he was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison.
Applying the reasoning it had recently carved out in Schenck, the Su-
preme Court upheld his conviction and sentence.24
Skip ahead to World War II and there is evidence of similar violations
of civil liberties. One hundred and ten thousand Japanese-Americans,
both aliens and citizens, were uprooted from their lifelong homes and
placed in prisons Franklin Roosevelt called "concentration camps."'25 Of
these one hundred and ten thousand, seventy thousand were United
States citizens.26 Adults and children, individuals with loved ones in the
military, were all placed behind barbed wire. Race alone determined
who was going to be free and who was incarcerated. There is absolutely
no evidence that this did anything to make the country safer. Not one
Japanese-American was ever accused, indicted, or convicted of espionage
or any crime against national security, but the deprivation of rights was
enormous.
But, perhaps the most infamous instance of the deprivation of civil lib-
erties in the last century is the McCarthy era. It was the age of suspicion,
where the mere suggestion of communist beliefs or ties was enough for a
person to lose their job and sometimes their liberty. The famous Su-
preme Court case in the McCarthy era was United States v. Dennis.27
Dennis involved a group of individuals who were convicted of teaching
19. Id. at 52.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211. 212 (1919).
23. Id. at 214.
24. Id. at 215, 217.
25. GREG ROBINSON, By ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 56 (2001).
26. See id. at 127-28.
27. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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several works by Marx, Engle, and Lenin.28 For doing this, they were
convicted under the Smith Act for conspiring "to advocate the overthrow
of the United States government. '29 Notice that the defendants in Den-
nis were not convicted of plotting to overthrow the United States govern-
ment. They were not even convicted of advocating the overthrow of the
United States government. Their only crime was conspiracy to advocate
the overthrow of the United States government. 30 For this alleged con-
spiracy they were convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison. In
upholding the convictions and sentences, Chief Justice Vinson equated
defendants' conspiracy with an attempt to overthrow the government:
"Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to teach and ad-
vocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force
and violence created a 'clear and present danger' of an attempt to over-
throw the Government by force and violence."' 31 Based on this analysis,
the Court determined that the convictions were proper under the Smith
Act.
II. CIVIL LIBERTIES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
When all of these events are considered in light of what has occurred
since September 11, 2001, it would seem that the worst of American his-
tory is repeating itself. Today, as in the past, Americans suffer the loss of
basic civil liberties. Although these infringements are aimed at increasing
security, these measures have not made us any safer. This Essay will dis-
cuss three significant examples of the modern compromise between lib-
erty and security: detentions, torture and privacy. As each of these
instances indicates, the United States government continues to trade ba-
sic civil liberties for the false promise of security.
A. DETENTIONS
How many people has the United States government detained since
September 11? I am reasonably sure that no one is able to answer to that
question, because the government will not release that information. Ini-
tially, the government announced the number of individuals held on im-
migration violations as a part of the war on terror. But since December
31, 2001 the government has declined to disclose that information. The
government also refuses to disclose how many people have been held
under material witness warrants or how many people are held in rendi-
tion camps around the world. These actions represent an unprecedented
assertion of authority to detain individuals without complying with the
Constitution and international law.
For the first time in American history, except perhaps for the Civil
War, the government claims it can hold American citizens, people belong-
28. Id. at 497-98.
29. Id. at 499.
30. Id. at 497.
31. Id. at 516-517.
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ing in the United States, without complying with the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments. The most famous case of this involves a man by the
name of Jose Padilla.32 You might remember that in May 2002, Padilla
was apprehended in the Chicago O'Hare Airport. His alleged crime was
plotting to build and detonate a dirty bomb on the United States.33 No
one questioned whether he was an American citizen. So we have an
American citizen arrested in the United States for a crime allegedly com-
mitted in the United States. Nonetheless, the United States government
held him as an enemy combatant for four and a half years.34 They took
the position that they could do so indefinitely and they did not provide
any constitutional protections. 35
Think about how enormous this assertion of power is. This is no less
than a claim of authority than suspending the Fourth Amendment, which
generally requires a warrant from a neutral judge before arrest; the Fifth
Amendment, which requires a grand jury indictment before a person is
held; and the Sixth Amendment, which requires proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt and trial by jury.36 If Padilla can be held on this basis, then why
can't terrorists like McVeigh and Nichols be held on this basis because of
the Oklahoma City bombing? If the president's power is truly as broad
as the government claimed in Padilla, then ostensibly any time an individ-
ual attacks Americans on American soil, the president could designate
them an enemy combatant and hold them indefinitely.
There is another case that involves a person being held by the United
States similar to Padilla that received a lot less media attention. It in-
volves a man by the name of Ali al-Marri.37 Al Marri was a resident
alien, lawfully in the United States, studying at Bradley University in Illi-
nois.38 In 2002, he was apprehended and has been held as an enemy com-
batant ever since. Ali al-Marri has been in government custody for over
six years, but he has never been charged with any crime and has never
been convicted of any wrongdoing.39 Finally, this summer the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the constitu-
tionality of al-Marri's detention. According to the five to four en banc
ruling, the mere act of engaging in unlawful behavior does not make an
individual an enemy combatant.40 Therefore the court determined al-
Marri could not be detained and deprived due process simply because his
conduct was on behalf of a terrorist organization. 41 At the time this Es-
say was written, the United States government was seeking review of that
decision in the United States Supreme Court.
32. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
33. Id. at 430-31.
34. Id. at 431-32.
35. Id.
36. See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.
37. AI-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008)
38. Id. at 219.
39. Id. at 220.




In addition to the detention of individuals on American soil, we can
also discuss the individuals who are held in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. I
should disclose now that I have been representing a Guantdnamo de-
tainee since July of 2002, a man by the name of Salem Gherebi. He is
about my height, approximately 5'7", perhaps a bit slimmer in build than
I am; he has a long, gray beard; and he has three children. I can tell you
in all honesty, I have no idea why he is being held. I recently visited him
he says he has no idea why he is being held. I read the transcript of his
Combatant Status Review Tribunal and it does not give a hint as to why
he is being held. Now, I will readily concede that he may be a very dan-
gerous person who deserves to be locked up, but I also know that he
might be there by mistake. We now know to a certainty that many of the
individuals who were brought to Guantdnamo were taken there by mis-
take.42 The United States paid warlords in Afghanistan to name those
with ties in Al Qaeda. 43 Not surprisingly, some of those warlords named
their rivals to get them out of the way; others named individuals simply to
collect a bounty.44 I do not know which category he represents, but how
can we ever know without some form of due process? Rather than offer
due process, the United States continues to assert that it can hold the
individuals in Guantdnamo indefinitely. 45
The first step toward the resolution of these cases came in the spring of
2004 when the Supreme Court finally considered the constitutionality of
the detention of American citizens as enemy combatants. 46 The Court's
holding in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was an extraordinary development. At
oral arguments, Justice Ginsburg asked Paul Clement, then the Deputy
Solicitor General of the United States, if it was the government's position
that it could hold the Guantgnamo detainees literally forever. 47 He said
"yes."' 48 Justice Ginsburg then asked: What if the government were to
torture individuals, are you still saying that there would be no hearing by
the federal court? 49 Mr. Clement said the United States military would
never engage in torture.50 That night, by some coincidence, the first re-
ports of the torture that occurred at Abu Ghraib were reported on the
national news. We will never know if the events at Abu Ghraib influ-
enced what the Supreme Court did, but the justices ruled six to three that
42. See Michiko Kakutani, How Abu Ghraib Became the Anything-Goes Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2008, at E8.
43. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. in Talks to Return Scores Held at Cuba Site, N.Y. TIMES, De-
cember 1, 2003, at A7.
44. See id.
45. Subsequently, the United States granted certiorari, but on March 6, 2009, the
United States announced that it was criminally indicting AI-Marri and thus that he was no
longer being held as an enemy combatant. The case was then dismissed by the Supreme
Court.
46. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
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those held in Guantinamo had access to the federal courts and the writ of
habeas corpus. 51
The case was remanded to federal district court, and the United States
government moved to dismiss.5 2 The D.C. District Court judges decided
to consolidate all of the Guantinamo cases in front of one judge, rather
than have each of the judges hear the same matter. They asked a senior
judge, highly respected Judge Joyce Hens Green, to do it. Under the con-
solidation agreement, no judge had to relinquish his or her cases, and one
judge, Richard Leon, refused to do so. About ten cases were before
Judge Leon and about sixty cases before Judge Green. Judge Leon had
most of the prisoner cases on his docket dismissed.53 According to Judge
Leon, no claim existed under the Constitution; therefore, the only appro-
priate resolution was to dismiss the cases.54 Judge Green, on the other
hand, denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoners had a
cause of action under the Constitution.55 My client is part of Judge
Green's detainee cases. One of the things that bothers me most is that
none of the judges involved took any urgency to this. These are human
beings held in small cells in solitary confinement that the government has
not yet shown to be guilty, and yet the judges saw no need to expedite the
proceedings.
In response to Padilla, Hamdi, and the public's growing outrage at the
treatment of Guant~inamo detainees, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act (DTA). The DTA was signed into law on December 30,
2005 and places restrictions on the treatment and interrogation of detain-
ees in the custody of the United States government. 56 The Act also en-
sures that prisoners in Guantfnamo have access to federal courts and the
writ of habeas corpus.57
Another significant development came with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.58 According to the Court, the military com-
mission lacked the power to proceed in Hamdan's case. Although the
Uniform Code of Military Justice permits the President to use military
commissions in specific circumstances, the President is still required to
follow the American common law of war and the rules and precepts of
the law of nations.5 9 The use of a military commission in Hamdan's case
would violate these laws. 60
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
52. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 378 F.3d 426, 426 (4th Cir. 2004).
53. See Human Rights First, In the Courts: Detentions at GuantAnamo Bay, http://




56. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1003, 119
Stat. 2739, 2739-40 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000dd (Supp. V. 2005)).
57. Id.





A few months later, in October 2006, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) which limited access to federal courts.61 Under
the MCA, noncitizens held as enemy combatants are not permitted to
access federal courts through habeas corpus or otherwise.62 Instead, the
only process available to noncitizen enemy combatants is military pro-
ceedings. 63 But in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court ruled five to
four that the Guant~inamo detainees do have a right to access the federal
courts and habeas corpus. 64 The Court found the Military Commissions
Act to be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.65
Now, all of these cases are back in the federal district court and the pro-
ceedings still seem to drag on. The result is that individuals like Salem
Gherebi-a man who has been held six and a half years without a
charge-still have no meaningful due process.
B. TORTURE
The second example that I want to give you is torture. A few years
ago, the Washington Post ran a series of stories disclosing that the CIA
had created rendition camps.66 These rendition camps were places that
the United States was taking suspected terrorists. They were located in
some of the countries that have the worst record with regard to human
rights. The United States government did not acknowledge the accuracy
of these reports. Instead, they threatened to investigate the Washington
Post for violating the Espionage Act by disclosing confidential informa-
tion. Top Bush administration officials met with the press that week to
condemn the Washington Post's reports. Thankfully, the Washington Post
did not get indicted; instead it won the Pulitzer Prize for the stories.
It was ultimately President Bush who persuaded Congress to pass the
Military Commissions Act to remove individuals from rendition camps.67
You might remember when he said that the government was going to
move some of the individuals from rendition camps to Guantinamo. The
government never told us how many people have been taken from these
rendition camps. Estimates are anywhere from a few hundred to a few
thousand. But we now know to a certainty that individuals were taken
there and tortured in the most brutal way.68 We know that some of these
individuals died as a result of this torture.69




64. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor; Anti-Terror
Effort Continues to Grow, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, Wrongful
Imprisonment. Anatomy of a CIA Mistake; German Citizen Released After Months in 'Ren-
dition', WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at Al.
67. See Restoring American Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at A18.
68. See generally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF How THE
WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO THE WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 101-38 (2008).
69. Id.
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Now, I think that the debate over torture in a public discourse has been
unfortunately affected by the show "24." I think when we think of tor-
ture, we imagine Jack Bauer engaging in brief torture to find out where
the bomb is going off in New York City. As Jane Mayer details in her
book The Dark Side, individuals were taken to these rendition camps,
sometimes just by mistake.70 A man by the name of El-Masri, for in-
stance, was apprehended in Germany simply because of confusion over
his name.7 1 He was then taken to a rendition camp and tortured because
a high level CIA specialist reported having suspicions about him. 72 Ac-
cording to El-Masri, who later brought suit in federal court, he was sim-
ply apprehended off the streets and taken to a rendition camp, tortured
for several months, and then dropped off on the streets of Albania.73 El-
Masri's account of his kidnapping and imprisonment is chilling, yet a dis-
trict court in the Fourth Circuit dismissed the suit under the state secrets
doctrine. 74 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.7 5
What makes these accounts of torture even more shocking is our Na-
tion's long history of condemning such practices. Going back to the days
of George Washington, the United States government has always prided
itself on humane treatment of detainees and prisoners of war.76 Even
when the English army was treating American soldiers badly during the
Revolutionary War, accounts of English soldiers indicate that George
Washington ordered the American troops to use what we now regard as
the basis of human rights.77 This tradition of respect for human rights
continued into the twentieth century. The United States was one of the
architects of the treaties formulated at the Geneva Conventions, treaties
designed to govern the treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of
war. Never before has any administration claimed that it did not have to
follow the Geneva Protocols.
But the so-called "torture memos," written by Jay Bybee and John
Yoo, expressly stated that the President was not obligated to follow these
agreements. 78 Instead, the Bybee and Yoo Memos advised that compli-
ance with treaties and federal statutes forbidding torture were merely op-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 282.
72. Id.
73. El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532 (E.D. Va. 2006).
74. Id. at 540-41.
75. EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 311 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
373 (2007).
76. MAYER, supra note 68, at 8-9.
77. Id. at 83-84.
78. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in The TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo]; Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), in THE
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIH 38 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Yoo Memo].
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tional for the President.79 They also said that the President could literally
change the definition of torture so methods that have been widely disap-
proved, including putting bamboo shoots under somebody's fingernails or
inflicting pain directly to someone's genitals, would be supported under
the memo. And I know this is a strong statement, but I believe that those
responsible for the rendition camps and torture, especially Dick Cheney,
David Addington, Jay Bybee, and John Yoo, are war criminals and that
there should be an investigation and prosecution into their crimes. I do
not choose that language lightly.
Again, you do not need to read Jane Mayer's book or others to see the
extent to which the United States, for the first time in our history, has
really betrayed basic principles of human rights. I have been surprised
since September 11th, when I discuss Guantdnamo, that those in the audi-
ence who most agree with me are those who served in the military, or
those who have loved ones in the military. What they say to me again
and again is: How could the United States of America expect foreign na-
tions to follow international law when they have American prisoners if
this country does not follow international law when we have foreign
prisoners?
C. PRIVACY
The third and final example that I want to talk about concerns privacy.
Of course when government actions are shrouded in secrecy, the problem
that arises is that we can lose our privacy and not even realize it. I want
to discuss a couple examples of the losses of privacy that have occurred
since September 11th. One is the tremendous expansion in the use of so-
called national security letters. A national security letter is a type of ad-
ministrative subpoena that allows the government to obtain information
about an individual, even highly personal information, simply by sending
a demand letter. The use of national security letters preceded the Patriot
Act, but Section 215 of the Patriot Act defines the extent to which gov-
ernment agents can gain information by national security letter.80 Under
the Patriot Act, an FBI agent can send a letter to a bank, an educational
institution, public library, and even a bookstore to request information
about an individual.81 The institution that receives this letter is bound to
secrecy; it cannot tell the individual what information the letter seeks or
the information that has been disclosed.82 The University of Illinois Li-
brary said it has received hundreds of these so-called national security
letters to find out what books people have checked out from the Univer-
79. Bybee Memo, supra note 78; Yoo Memo, supra note 78, at 48.
80. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
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sity of Illinois Library. 83
The United States Department of Justice Inspector General issued a
report about eighteen months ago documenting the extensive abuses of
national security letters.84 I think this source is important. It was not
some liberal law professor; it was the Inspector General of the Justice
Department where Alberto Gonzales was Attorney General. Reports
described special agents in charge routinely signing national security let-
ters without even knowing the reason they were signing.85 The reports
revealed that national security letters were being issued without any basis
to them; and information was being requested with no justification at
all.8 6 The reports indicate that highly personal information, even medical
information, was routinely being collected by the government. 87
Warrantless electronic eavesdropping is another example of the loss of
privacy. A couple of years ago, the New York Times revealed that Presi-
dent Bush signed an executive order that authorized the National Secur-
ity Agency to engage in warrantless electronic eavesdropping of
conversations regarding phone calls between those in foreign countries
and also e-mail communication between those in foreign countries.88
There is no doubt that this violates both the Fourth Amendment and fed-
eral statutes. The Fourth Amendment has long been interpreted to apply
to searches and seizures of electronic communication and such electronic
eavesdropping generally requires a warrant for probable cause.89 Addi-
tionally, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 90 (FISA), adopted in
1978, and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, create a
procedural framework for electronic surveillance. 91 Title III provides a
basic procedure that any police, local, state or federal, must follow to
engage in electronic surveillance. Under Title III, warrantless electronic
surveillance is generally barred.92 FISA's provisions supersede Title III
with respect to foreign intelligence and create a procedure for warrantless
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. 93 Under FISA,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court must hear applications for
and grant orders approving electronic surveillance against suspected for-
83. See Refusing to Allow Pressure to Silence a Critical Voice, CHI. TRIB., April 1, 2007,
at C1.
84. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS (2007),
available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/special.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id. at 66-67.
87. Id.
88. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at Al.
89. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1967)
90. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50
U.S.C.).
91. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2511
(2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
92. Id.
93. FISA § 102.
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eign intelligence agents inside the United States. 94 According to the stat-
ute, the federal agency applying for an electronic surveillance warrant
must show that, among other things, the purpose of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information and that such information cannot
be obtained by normal investigative techniques, and it must also provide
a statement of how the surveillance. will be conducted. 95 If the federal
agency meets the requirements set forth in FISA, the judge must either
issue an order granting the surveillance as requested or modify the order
and grant the surveillance. 96 The Patriot Act expands the court created
under FISA from seven to eleven judges, ostensibly creating an even
broader power for the gathering of foreign intelligence information. Sta-
tistics show that the government prevails 99.5 percent of the time in the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Now, you might say that is be-
cause the court is highly presidential. You might say the government has
a strong basis for the information it seeks. But what is so striking about
the Bush executive order granting warrantless surveillance is that it by-
passed all of these constitutional and statutory procedures; procedures
that have traditionally favored requests for surveillance from federal
agencies. The Bush Administration claimed the outright authority to en-
gage in warrantless electronic surveillance; ignoring the Fourth Amend-
ment, and ignoring federal law. But, of course, if the President can ignore
the Fourth Amendment, why not the First Amendment? Why not any
constitutional provision?
In ACLU v. National Security Agency, the ACLU brought suit over this
practice.97 A federal district court judge in Detroit ruled in favor of the
ACLU.9s Then a year and a half ago, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit ruled in a two to one decision that overturned the
district court. 99 The Sixth Circuit said the plaintiffs did not have a stand-
ing because the state secrets doctrine prevented the introduction of evi-
dence that their conversations had been intercepted. 100 The Supreme
Court denied the appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
Let me conclude with two quotes from late Supreme Court justices.
One comes from the late Justice Robert Jackson; he said, "The Constitu-
tion is not a suicide pact." 10 1 And of course he is right. I do not want
anything I am saying tonight to convey that I believe that the rights of the
Constitution are absolute. I do believe that federal liberties sometimes
might be compromised by national security. But I also believe that
94. Id. § 103.
95. Id. § 104.
96. See id. § 105.
97. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
98. Id. at 782.
99. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008).
100. Id. at 656.
101. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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before basic liberties are infringed, this is truly necessary, there is no
other way to safeguard national security. The other quote comes from
late Justice Louis Brandeis, who said that the greatest threat to liberty
was when people claimed to act for beneficial purposes. 10 2 He said:
"Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers. ' 103 Justice Brandeis also observed that "[t]he
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.' 1 4 Now Louis Brandeis never
knew Alberto Gonzales, Dick Cheney or Donald Rumsfeld, but he could
not have picked better words if he did.
102. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("Ex-
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